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THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT:
HISTORICAL PREDECESSORS AND
CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION
Abstract: The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA93) significantly expanded the earned income credit (EIC), which was changed
to include low-income taxpayers without dependents. Evolving, most
directly, from the "workfare" plan (1972) proposed by Senate Finance
Committee Chairman, Russel B. Long, and in response to President
Nixon's Family Assistance Program (FAP), the post-1974 EIC was not
the first of its kind. It had two predecessors.
The EIC of 1923 through 1931 benefitted taxpayers with or without dependents and excluded any "workfare" feature. A second EIC,
in n a m e only, was in effect for the 1934 through 1943 tax years.
This paper develops a historical framework for study of the post1974 EIC. This framework necessarily precedes any investigation of
contemporary issues relating to the twenty-year history of the post1974 EIC which, unlike its first predecessor, appears destined to continue as a permanent, expanding mechanism for the delivery of basic
subsistence to the "working poor." The resolution of these contemporary issues will determine whether the post-1974 EIC is destined to
replace or continue to co-exist with a (presumably) more costly welfare delivery system.

INTRODUCTION
Initially designed to partially offset the adverse and rapidly
growing impact of increasing Social Security taxes on the working poor, the EIC has undergone several expansionary stages
since first introduced (in its current form) for the 1975 tax year. 1
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA93) eliminated the
separate health insurance and newborn child components of the
earned income credit (EIC) and provided for a revised, basic

I would like to thank Fritz Scheuren, Director of the Statistics of Income
Division - Individuals of the Internal Revenue Service, for providing the 1989
sample data used for portions of this paper. Also, two anonymous reviewers for
their insightful comments and suggestions.
1
Table 3 summarizes EIC phase-in, flat, and phase-out ranges from 1975
through 1996. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 provide graphical representations of the same.
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EIC to include low-income taxpayers without dependents. This,
ever-evolving, post-1974 EIC is not the first of its kind.
The first EIC was available for the 1923 through 1931 tax
years. Unlike the post-1974 EIC, the first EIC was never dependency exemption-based, did not provide for a "refundable"
credit, and did not, in its final form, seek to maintain any form
of "workfare" or work incentive feature.
A new, revised EIC became available for the 1934 through
1943 tax years. This second EIC was a "credit" in name only. It
was what today might be referred to as a "deduction" and eventually evolved into the current "standard deduction," available to
non-itemizer taxpayers. 2
This paper describes and distinguishes between the first
(1923 through 1931), second (1934 through 1943), and current
(post-1974) EICs. It summarizes events leading to the post-1974
EIC and provides a basic structural framework for analysis of
the post-1974 EIC period. It reviews many of the concerns
raised by contemporary policy-makers and researchers that remain unresolved (or are exacerbated) after RRA93.
The lack of widespread knowledge and acceptance of EIC
advanced payment options and the failure of the RRA93 expansion of the EIC to provide for any form of wealth-based means
test represent problems unlike those previously encountered by
our tax collection system. However, the incompatibility of the
"workfare" provisions of the contemporary EIC with existing
welfare systems suggests that certain historical lessons have
gone unnoticed by contemporary policy-makers.
THE FORM OF THE EIC
The post-1974 EIC contains a "work incentive" feature, increasing its political palatability and distinguishing it from a
"negative income tax" or some other form of a "guaranteed
m i n i m u m income." Ammer and Ammer (1977, p. 284) define a
"negative income tax" as
(a) form of welfare payment whereby all low-income
individuals and families receive a direct cash subsidy
from the government that is sufficient to raise them to
2

A tax "credit" results in a dollar for dollar reduction in the taxpayer's tax
liability. A tax "deduction" is multiplied by a taxpayer-specific marginal tax rate
to determine the taxpayer's tax liability reduction. A tax credit, therefore, is
more valuable (to any taxpayer) than a tax deduction for an equal amount.
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subsistence level. The subsidy itself is the negative tax.
Supporters . . . argue that it could replace all other welfare programs, along with the bureaucracy and alleged
waste they engender. Critics, however, believe it would
remove incentives to work . . . A version of this idea was
put into practice in 1975, when all U.S. social security
recipients received a supplementary check for $50, regardless of their income.
A negative income tax is a welfare program, providing a
basic grant to individuals with no income. (The Aid to Families
with Dependent Children - Foster Care (AFDC-FC) program is
an example of a welfare program). As Exhibit 1 illustrates, the
negative income tax is phased-out as income increases, until it
eventually reaches zero and the individual begins to pay tax. The
general form of the post-1974 EIC is also illustrated by Exhibit I.
Note that the EIC provides for a variation of a negative income
tax, but differs from the true form in two respects: (1) the EIC
increases as the taxpayer's earned income (EI) increases and (2)
a taxpayer with no EI receives no credit.
A true negative income tax would typically provide for a
larger (smaller) subsidy as income decreases (increases). Therefore, the EI requirements of the post-1974 EIC, unlike other
welfare programs, maintains a politically popular "workfare" element.
The new EI credit addresses ability-to-pay issues by reducing the impact of rising, regressive Social Security taxes on the
working poor. This objective is achieved while simultaneously
maintaining Social Security contributions characterized by progressive benefit structures (and based on the family unit).
The low-income taxpayers intended to benefit from the
post-1974 EIC are typically not subject to progressive income
tax rates. Therefore, EIC provisions are consistent with a family
assistance philosophy while leaving intact the existing Social
Security tax (and benefit) system.
Beginning on July 1, 1979, eligible taxpayers anticipating an
EIC-based refund had the option of receiving an advanced EIC
payment (AEIC), reported as a reduction of the EIC on the
taxpayer's federal income tax return, and limited to the amount
available for one qualifying child. In this respect, the EIC possesses a cash or near-cash feature and behaves like a negative
income tax or welfare benefit to low-income taxpayers.
The successful public acceptance of this alternative to welfare programs such as AFDC-FC, etc., must necessarily precede
Published by eGrove, 1995
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the elimination of alternative, presumably more costly, 3 basic
subsistence delivery systems. However, as Yin and F o r m a n
[1993, p. 951] point out,". . . almost none of the recipients obtains the benefit incrementally during the course of the year"
and Holt [1994, p. 759] indicates that " . . . fewer than 1 in 200
EIC recipients takes advantage . . . " of the AEIC.
THE POST-1993 EIC REINFORCES CERTAIN
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
RRA93 provides for the beneficial inclusion of low-income
taxpayers without dependents for post-1993 tax years. Prior to
RRA93, there was some disagreement with respect to the appropriate operational definition of the marriage tax penalty (MTP).
Should the MTP include or exclude its largest component, the
EIC [Rosen, 1987 and 1988, and McIntyre, 1988]?
The EIC-based component of MTPs for the 1974 through
1993 tax years might have been eliminated from consideration
as true MTPs, under the assumption that such amounts were
attributable to the decision to have children, as distinguished
from the decision to marry. Though this point was not addressed in the literature, 4 the post-1993 EIC, with its beneficial
inclusion of low-income taxpayers without dependents, eliminates the potential for such distinctions for post-1993 tax years.
Researchers interested in the historical relevance and magnitude
of post-1974 EIC-driven MTPs may find it useful to note this
distinction between pre-1994 and post-1993 periods to the extent that it presents the need for research design modification.
Though the post-1993 EIC will undoubtedly result in greater
MTPs [Lipman and Williamson, 1994, and Polinsky, 1993], it
has evolved from a qualified dependency exemption-based poverty reduction measure, to one more inclusive of the general
population. Though still "workfare"-dependent, the inclusion of
3
For example, the popular press has recently drawn attention to discussions
of a return to the use of orphanages to replace AFDC-FC group homes, etc. The
administrative costs of such programs include overpayments to providers, which
frequently go uncollected, since the over-riding concern of such agencies is the
shortage of placement facilities (see, for example, Report by the Auditor General
of California, 1986).
Costs of the post-RRA93 EIC are projected to approximate about $25 billion
in fiscal year 1998, roughly 150 percent of the federal share of the AFDC-FC
program [Yin and Forman, 1993, p. 951].
4
This may be the result of early emphasis on supplementing and/or eventually replacing the AFDC-FC programs with the EIC. See Hoffman and Seidman
[1990] and Campbell and Peirce [1980].
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low-income taxpayers without dependents as potential beneficiaries links the EIC more closely with general welfare programs
and reduces its similarity to the dependent-based AFDC-FC program.
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Three EICs have emerged over discontinuous periods and in
very different forms: the first EIC existed for a nine year period
(1923 through 1931) and the post-World War I benefits were
primarily short-term, economic stimulus-motivated, and available to all taxpayers; the second EIC lasted for a ten year period
(1934 through 1943) over which this "credit" evolved to take the
form of our current "standard deduction;" and the post-1974
EIC has evolved and expanded during this twenty-one years and
continues changing with the passage of RRA93 (1974 through
1994).
THE FIRST EIC (1923 THROUGH 1931)
The Revenue Act of 1921, enacted November 23, 1921, and
amended March 4, 1923 (see Revenue Act of 1924, H.R. 6715,
Public Law No. 176, p. 264), sought to stimulate an economy
recovering from World War I. Beginning with the 1923 (and
extending through the 1931) tax year(s), a nonrefundable EIC
was established and maintained. As described by P e c h m a n
[1987, pp. 109],
. . . the earned income allowance was granted in the
form of a deduction that ranged from 10 to 25 percent
of earned net income. In some years the deduction was
allowed for normal tax purposes only; in others it was
allowed for both normal tax and surtax. In all years a
certain minimum amount of income ($3,000 or $5,000)
was presumed to be earned whether it actually was or
not, and the deduction was limited to a maximum ranging from $10,000 to $30,000. The tax value of the deduction was . . . never worth more than $495 for a family of two (in 1928-31).. .
This first, nonrefundable EIC was originally formulated under the proposition that a distinction should be made favoring
(disfavoring) earned (unearned) income. The preference of a
system taxing lightly income earned relative to that resulting
from investments was supported under the "ability to pay"
principle, but was not without difficulty in administration. The
discussion of this inequity and the administrative difficulties
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/4
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were addressed (see the Revenue Act of 1924, H.R. 6715, Public
Law No. 176, p. 264):
The taxpayer who receives salaries, wages, and other
earned income must each year save and set aside a portion of his income in order to protect him in case of
sickness and in his old age, and in order to provide for
his family upon his death. On the other hand, the person whose income is derived from investments already
has his capital and is relieved of the necessity of saving
to establish it.
The difficulty comes when an attempt is made to divide
that income which is in part earned and in part unearned into the two classes. Such a segregation would
involve either (1) treating as unearned that part of the
taxpayer's income which represents a reasonable return
upon the capital invested and considering the remainder as earned or (2) treating as earned income an
amount representing a reasonable allowance as, in connection with the administration of the excess-profits
tax, salary for the personal services actually rendered by
the taxpayer.
Initial proposals (see Ways and Means Committee, 68th
Congress, 1st Session, House Report 179, p. 78) of a 25 percent
tax reduction for taxpayers whose incomes were earned would
have benefitted salaried and professional people, but would have
excluded farmers (currently, Schedule F income) and self-employed or small business persons (currently, Schedule C and
certain K-l pass-throughs for closely held S corporation income).
Because of the administrative difficulties in arriving at an
equitable solution to the segregation of earned and unearned
components of certain classes of income, the "earned" income
credit became a misnomer. This first EIC was extended to all
individuals subject to the normal tax.
Furthermore, it imposed no requirements with respect to
the existence of a dependent or qualifying dependency exemption. In fact, upon review of the early part of this period, this
first EIC would appear to have gone so far as to favor (disfavor)
single (married) taxpayers by providing for m i n i m u m and maxim u m EICs of $20 ($12.50) and $75 ($55 5 ), respectively.
5
This credit could increase to as m u c h as $90 when the entire personal
exemption amount was taken by one spouse (i.e., married, filing separately) and
in the event that no dependency exemptions were available [KixMiller & Baar,
1924, pp. 19-20].
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It is important to note, however, that these provisions were
designed prior to/in the absence of our post-1970 (and current)
system of separate tax rate schedules for married and single
taxpayers [Brozovsky and Cataldo, 1994, pp. 179-180]. During
this period, two-earner, married taxpayers were effectively permitted the option of using the same progressive tax rate table
twice. Therefore, the "rate" component of the marriage tax bonus (MTB) associated with the pre-1971 period tax rate schedules might, today, be perceived as more than adequately compensatory for the failure to extend additional preferential
treatment to married taxpayers in the form of a larger EIC.
TABLE 1
The First EARNED INCOME CREDIT
(1923 through 1931)
Total Returns
Tax
Year

Total
Returns

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931

7,698,321
7,369,788
4,171,051
4,138,092
4,101,547
4,070,851
4,044,327
3,707,509
3,225,924

1923-31 Averages

Average
Wage
$1,844
$1,848
$2,336
$2,415
$2,491
$2,668
$2,769
$2,676
$2,581

Taxable Returns
Average
EIC

Taxable
Returns

Average
EIC

Average
Tax Rate

$28.65
$ 4.16
$ 5.89
$ 5.96
$ 6.07
$ 8.55
$ 5.46
$ 6.71
$ 5.42

4,270,121
4,489,698
2,501,166
2,470,990
2,440,941
2,523,063
2,458,049
2,037,645
1,525,546

$51.65
$ 6.82
$ 9.82
$ 9.97
$10.21
$13.79
$ 8.98
$12.21
$11.47

2.67%
2.74%
3.35%
3.33%
3.68%
4.62%
4.04%
2.63%
1.81%

$10.41

3.275%

$ 6.03

A summary of the average EIC for total and taxable returns
for the 1923 through 1931 tax years (Internal Revenue Code
Section (IRC §) 1200(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924) is provided
in Table 1 [SOI, 1931, pp. 37-43]. Though retained for the 1924
through 1931 tax years/the short-term, post-World War I stimulus nature of this first EIC is apparent when comparing the 1923
average EIC of $52 per taxable return to the significantly lower
average EICs for the post-1923 tax years.
THE SECOND EIC (1934 THROUGH 1943)
A new, revised EIC was made available for the 1934 through
1943 tax years. This EIC bore little resemblance to its predeceshttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/4
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sor. This "credit" resulted in a reduction of taxable amounts
subject to the normal tax (as opposed to the surtax). Brozovsky
& Cataldo [1994, pp. 173-174] state that
(u)nlike the preceding EIC, this "credit" on earned income was comparable to what is today referred to as a
"deduction". This "credit" on earned income was restricted in amount to 10% of the first $14,000 of "net
income" for a maximum deduction of $1,400 for single
or married taxpayers.
This EIC evolved into a variable standard deduction (1944
t h r o u g h 1963), a semi-variable s t a n d a r d d e d u c t i o n (1964
through 1976), and currently takes the form of an inflationindexed, fixed standard deduction (1977 through present), subject to phase-out and eventual elimination for the post-1990 tax
years [Brozovsky & Cataldo, 1994, pp. 168-169].
Events Immediately

Preceding the Post-1974 EIC

What later came to be known as the New Frontier, the War
on Poverty, and the Great Society, represented the culmination
of considerable discussion regarding the possibility of a negative
income tax or a guaranteed minimum income or (basic subsistence) allowance as a m e a n s of perfecting or completing
Roosevelt's New Deal. As described by Hildebrand [1967, pp. 12],
(w)ithin the first six months of 1966 alone, three important official documents . . . appeared, all of which commend the goal of universal guaranteed minimum income . . .
W a r on Poverty (1964) efforts originated and extended
through the Kennedy (1961-1963), Johnson (1963-1969), and
Nixon (1969-1975) administrations. These efforts coincided
with/were overshadowed by the assassinations of President John
F. Kennedy (1963), Robert F. Kennedy (1968), and Martin
Luther King (1968), passage of the Civil Rights Act (1964), the
"Americanization" (1965) of the Vietnam War (1957-1975)
[Zarefsky, 1986], and Nixon's Family Assistance Program (FAP)
[Burke and Burke, 1974].
Aaron (1978), in his forward,
. . . argues that the Great society did not fall of its own
weight, but rather was eclipsed by external events —
the war in Vietnam, the dissolution of the civil rights
Published by eGrove, 1995
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coalition, and the political defalcations of the Nixon
Administration.
The initial, post-1974 EIC closely resembled the $400 credit
or "workfare" plan (1972) proposed by, then, Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, Russel B. Long (Democrat - Louisiana). Senator Long's father, Senator Huey Long (Democrat Louisiana), had been a proponent of the "Share the Wealth Society" (1934) prior to his assassination in September, 1935 [Burke
and Burke, 1974, p. 151].
Russel Long had been an outspoken critic of Nixon's FAP,
for its failure to provide adequate work incentives. The FAP was
rejected by the Senate Finance Committee (1972) in favor of
Chairman Long's "workfare" plan.
THE POST-1974 EIC (1975 FORWARD)
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 provided the foundation
upon which our current EIC is based. This post-1974 EIC was a
delayed outgrowth of the extended period of political liberalism
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
The post-1974 EIC differed significantly from the first EIC
(1923 through 1931). These differences are restated and summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2
A Comparison of the First EIC (1923 through 1931)
and the Post-1974 EIC
First EIC
Never refundable.

Post-1974 EIC
Refundable, and beginning July 1, 1979,
as a payroll advance (AEIC).

Never restricted or based only
on "earned" income.

Always based only on 'earned
income.

Always available to single
taxpayers or taxpayers
without dependents.

First available to low-income taxpayers
without dependents for post-1993
tax years (RRA93).

Introduced at a time when the
same rate schedules applied to
single and married taxpayers.

Introduced after separate, post-1970,
rate schedules were developed for single
and married taxpayers.

Pre-dated the Social Security
system.

Post-dated the Social Security system.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/4
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The evolution of the contemporary EIC is divided into three
distinct phases: Phase I - initial implementation (1975 through
1990), Phase II - expansion into additional, separable components for health care costs and newborn children 6 (1991 through
1993), and Phase III - merger of previously developed separable
EIC-based components and the inclusion of low-income taxpayers without dependents (1994 forward).
Eligibility for the EIC, as modified throughout Phases I and
II, included criterion for dependent (1) relationship, (2) residency, and (3) age limitations. The similarities of these early
requirements to the dependency-based AFDC-FC welfare program has been mentioned previously and is apparent. The Phase
III period resulted in the elimination of qualified dependency
exemption requirements.
Phase I (1975 Through 1990)
The EIC, in its recent historical form, was first made available for the 1975 tax year and only to low-income workers who
maintained a household for dependent children, for whom they
were able to claim an exemption. Designed to reduce the impact
of Social Security taxes and encourage the pursuit of employment by low-income individuals, EI includes wages/salaries (and
related compensation) and net earnings (losses) from self-employment (Schedules C, F, and, potentially, Schedule E income).
This EIC was the first refundable credit. It was treated as a tax
payment and, therefore, subject to refund.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided for a continuation of
the EIC for the 1976 and 1977 tax years, while liberalizing the
requirements for claimants. The Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 extended the EIC through the 1978 tax year.
Finally, the Revenue Act of 1978 increased the amount of the
EIC and made it a permanent component of the tax law.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided for inflation-indexation of phaseout amounts, maximum adjusted gross income
(AGI) limitations, and the maximum available EIC amount.
(These amounts are adjusted, annually, according to changes in
the Consumer Price Index-based measures between August 31 of
the preceding year and August 31 of the current year). For the
1987 tax year, the EIC phaseout at the 10% rate began at $6,925
($9,000 as indexed for post-1987 tax years) of the greater of EI
or AGI (see Table III). No EIC was available for taxpayers with
6

Taken in lieu of the child and dependent care credit (Form 2441).
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AGIs or EI of $15,432 (or greater) for the 1987 tax year ($17,000
as indexed for post-1987 tax years).
Indexation from 1987 base amounts resulted in increases of
EIC phaseout amounts and EIC-based maximum AGIs of approximately 9%, 4%, 5%, 5%, 5%, and 3% (all rounded) for the
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 tax years, respectively.
The relationship of EIC phaseout amounts to EIC-based maximum AGIs remained relatively stable throughout this post-1987
through pre-1994 period, with the EIC phaseout amounts approximating 53% of the EIC-based maximum AGIs.

EXHBIT 2
Contemporary EARNED INCOME CREDIT — Phase I
1975 through 1990 (in nominal dollars)
Amount of EARNED INCOME CREDIT

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/4
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TABLE 3
Evolution of the Post-1974
EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC)
(1975 through 1994 and 1995 & 1996
before Inflation-Adjustment)
Tax
Qualify Credit
Year(s) Dpndnts Rate

PhaseOut
Rate

"Flat" Range
Begin
End

Phase I: Initial Implementation of the Post-1974 EIC
>0
10.00% 10.000% $4,000 $ 4,000
1975-78
>0
10.00% 12.500% $5,000 $ 6,000
1979-84
>0
11.00% 12.222% $5,000 $ 6,500
1985-86
1987
>0
14.00% 10.000% $6,080 $ 6,920
>0
14.00% 10.000% $6,240 $ 9,840
1988
>0
14.00% 10.000% $6,500 $10,240
1989
>0
14.00% 10.000% $6,810 $10,734
1990
Phase II: Supplemental Health Care
1
16.70% 11.930%
1991
2
17.30% 12.360%
4.285%
Health
6.00%
3.570%
Newborn 5.00%
1992
1
17.60% 12.570%
2
18.40% 13.140%
4.285%
Health
6.00%
Newborn 5.00%
3.570%
1
18.50% 13.210%
1993
2
19.50% 13.930%
Health
6.00%
4.285%
Newborn 5.00%
3.570%

Max
EI or
AGI

$ 8,000
$10,000
$11,000
$15,432
$18,576
$19,340
$20,264

Max
EIC

Avg
Rfnd
EIC

$400
$500
$550
$851
$874
$910
$953

$203
$270
$317
$452
$540
$560
$605

and Newborn Components Added
$7,140 $11,250 $21,250 $1,192
$1,235
" "
"
$428
" "
"
$357
" "
"
$7,520 $11,840 $22,370 $1,324
$1,384
" "
"
$451
" "
"
$376
" "
"
$7,750 $12,200 $23,050 $1,434
$1,511
" "
"
$465
" "
"
" "
"
$388

Phase III: Supplemental Components Combined with the Basic Credit
& Inclusion of Low-Income Taxpayers Without Dependents
$5,000
$9,000 $306
1994
0
7.65%
7.650% $4,000
26.30% 15.980% $7,750 $11,000 $23,753 $2,038
1
2
30.00% 17.680% $8,425
$25,300 $2,528
"
$9,378 $319
7.65%
$5,210
7.650% $4,168
1995
0
34.00% 15.980% $6,252 $11,462 $24,764 $2,126
1
$27,090 $3,160
2
36.00% 20.222% $8,779
"
7.65%
$5,429
$9,772 $332
1996
0
7.650% $4,343
34.00% 15.980% $6,515 $11,943 $25,804 $2,215
1
$29,318 $3,659
2
40.00% 21.060% $9,148

A
A
A
A

B
B
B
B
B
B

Note A: $793. Not specified as a separate measure for each EIC component.
Note B: Projected at an annual inflation rate of 4.2% each for 1995 & 1996.
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Exhibit 2 was developed from the information contained in
Table 3 [SOI, 1977-1993] and provides a graphic representation
of the contemporary EIC during the 1975 through 1990 (Phase
I) tax years [SOI, 1977-1992], under the simplifying assumption
that the taxpayer's EI is equivalent to their AGI. For post-1986
tax years, the slope of the phase-in (i.e., credit percentage) of the
EIC increased, and, with the exception of the 1987 tax year, the
flat range, over which the m a x i m u m EIC was available, increased in breadth.
However, it is generally acknowledged that during this period, the "working poor" lost ground with respect to the inflation-indexed value of exemptions. As pointed out by Sommerfeld, et al., p. 56,
. . . (I)n the mid-1970s a family of four began to owe an
income tax only after it earned about 18-20% over (emphasis added) the poverty line. By the mid-1980s, the
same household was required to pay an income tax after earning an income level significantly below (emphasis added) the poverty level. Indexation for inflation and
increases in the earned income credit, the standard deduction, and the personal exemption allowed the working poor to be exempt from income tax until their income exceeded the poverty level. These changes are
expected to keep taxpayers in the same position relative
to the poverty line thereafter by indexing the standard
deduction and exemption amount.
Table 3 summarizes key components of the recent historical
EIC for the entire 19 year, post-1974 period (i.e., 1975 through
1993) under review. The following formulas, as they relate to the
data summarized in Table 3, provide the basis for the calculation of the EIC for all three phases (including the separable/
supplemental health care- and newborn-based EICs, not graphically depicted, but available during the Phase II period of 1991
through 1993), where the EIC is the lesser of (la) or (lb).
( l a ) Credit Rate X Min { EI, Flat Range BEGIN }
( l b ) Maximum EIC [ Phase-Out Rate X ( Max { AGI, E I }
- Flat Range END ) ]
The flat range is that range of EI over which the EIC is
maximized. The beginning of the flat range represents that EI
level where the maximum EIC is first achieved. The end of the
flat range represents the highest possible EI level where the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/4
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maximum EIC can be generated. Beyond this ceiling, the EIC is
reduced at the phase-out rate (see Table 3).
Phase II (1991 Through 1993)
For the 1991 [SOI, 1993] through 1993 tax years, additional,
separable EIC components were made available for supplemental health care/insurance expenses and newborn/young child dependents. Married, surviving spouse, or head of household filing
status (i.e., at least one qualifying child in the household) remained a requirement for qualification for the (1) basic, (2)
supplemental health insurance, and (3) supplemental young
child EICs. A new Form EIC was developed and used during this
period. However, the schedules, rules, and tables associated
with these separate EIC components were very difficult for the
average taxpayer to understand and were eliminated/merged
back to a single basic EIC form for the post-1993 period (i.e.,
Phase III).
Throughout the history of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act-/Self-Employed Contributions Act- (FICA-/SECA-)
based Social Security and (later) Medicare tax, beginning with
the 1937/1951 tax years, the amount to which an employee/employer or self-employed taxpayer was subject had been limited
by a ceiling or "wage base." This wage base was adjusted
through intermittent statutory or (currently) automatic inflation-indexed increases, but remained regressive. The EIC continued to partially or fully offset the regressive effects of Social
Security and Medicare and promote tax progressivity.
Separate, higher wage bases were established for FICA and
SECA Medicare components at 1.45% (each for employer and
employee) and 2.9% (for self-employed taxpayers), respectively,
during the 1991 through 1993 tax years. These increased wage
bases for the medicare components of FICA/SECA coincided
with the establishment and maintenance of separate supplemental health care and newborn EIC components.
Phase III (1994 Forward)
For post-1993 tax years, congruent with the first EIC (1923
through 1931), low-income taxpayers without dependents are
included as potential beneficiaries of the EIC. 7 With the post7

The EIC was originally denied to persons without children to avoid benefits
to (1) students, (2) retired persons (to avoid duplication of the benefits already

Published by eGrove, 1995

15

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 22 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 4
The Accounting

72

Historians Journal, June 1995

1993 move toward a broader definition of the "working poor,"
initially established EIC phase-in percentages equal related
phase-out percentages for low-income taxpayers without dependents, and are equivalent to the rates used for FICA employer
and employee contributions at 7.65% each (see Table 3).

EXHIBIT 3
Contemporary EARNED INCOME CREDIT —
Phases II & III
1991 through 1994 and 1995 & 1996 Projected*
Credit Rates (Phase-In Percentages) & Flat Ranges*
Earned Income Level
$13,000
$12,000
$11,000
$10,000
$9,000
$8,000
$7,000
$6,000
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
91-1 91-2

92-1

92-2 93-1 93-2 94-0 94-1

94-2

95-0 95-1 95-2 96-0

-1 96-2

Tax Year — Min. Req'd No. of Qualified Dependents
*1995 & 1996 Projections at 4.2% Annual Inflation Rates.

provided by the credit for the elderly (Schedule R)), and (3) part-time workers
with small amounts of EI.
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Exhibit 3 illustrates the recent historical trend for the credit
rates and flat ranges associated with post-1990 (i.e., Phases II
and III) EICs. The generally upward "creeping" (or inflationindexed) movement of these flat ranges is apparent throughout
the period.
The higher wage bases established for the Medicare component (i.e., 1.45% and 2.9% for employer/employee and self-employed taxpayers, respectively) for the 1991 through 1993 (Phase
II) period have been completely eliminated for post-1993 tax
years, creating a "flat" or proportional tax for this (previously
regressive) component of FICA/SECA. The elimination of this
ceiling coincides with the establishment of the no dependent
EIC inclusion for post-1993 tax years (see Exhibit 3).
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
The difficulties associated with the distinction between
earned and unearned income in the establishment of the first
EIC (1923 through 1931) were considered, addressed, and circumvented by making the credit available to all taxpayers and
based on both earned and unearned income. These complications were not avoided under the more contemporary, post-1974
EIC, which attempts to create a distinction between earned and
unearned income. As a result, problems, other than those encountered in the early 1920s, have evolved.
First, in providing for the separate treatment of earned and
unearned income, the post-1974 EIC has included both wages
and self-employment income. Such amounts are often subject to
manipulation, and, as O'Neil and Nelsestuen (1994) have determined, a significant portion of EIC benefits may be providing
assistance to middle-class or even very wealthy taxpayers. 8 Similar conclusions were drawn by Cataldo (1994) in his review of
the projected trends and increased phase-in credit percentages
associated with the broader, post-1993 EIC-based flat ranges.
For example, wealthy taxpayers, already involved in taxminimizing strategies and in control of closely held corporations, might legitimately provide/manipulate the cost of their
own services (i.e., salaries) to EI levels falling within their respective flat ranges, in efforts to maximize potentially refund8

O'Neil and Nelsestuen [1994] proposed implementation of a "cliff-based"
wealth restriction measure, where the taxpayer's taxable and non-taxable interest income and taxable dividend income might be used, in aggregate form, as a
proxy for wealth and a means test for EIC benefits elimination.
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able EICs. Similarly, middle- (and high-) income, self-employed
taxpayers in the process of start-up or expansion, might manipulate income/expense items and even make post-year-end elecTABLE4
Selected Descriptive Statistics from 1989 SOI Returns
Taxpayers Benefitting from the EIC
Count (N) for Amounts > $910
AGI Class

N

Int

Div's

AGIs Below One Dollar ($1):
140
77
AGI<$1
38
PCT TTLS 2% 23%
36%

Sch E Sch C/F
19
13%

EIC
PALs AMT Mean Std Dev

75
8%

37
54
50% 77%

$496

$293

$113
$227
$341
$467
$604
$725
$839
$860
$880
$883
$852
$761
$675
$565
$477
$380
$274
$179
$86
$18

$123
$115
$88
$97
$105
$130
$147
$142
$122
$113
$110
$97
$56
$85
$55
$44
$55
$35
$30
$9

For All Returns (N=140; N=280 for Sch C/F) in AGI<$1 Class
Min
$0
$0
$(7)M $(421)K
Mean
$90K
$7K $(369)K
$(6)K
Max
$1.9M $334K
$507K $102K
Std Dev
$261K
$35K
$1M
$43K
AGIs Above Zero ($0):
0
AGI<$1K
75
0
AGI<$2K
131
5
AGI<$3K
159
5
AGI<$4K
207
6
AGI<$5K
225
9
AGI<$6K
249
10
AGI<$7K
303
12
AGI<$8K
323
10
AGI<$9K
329
AGI<$10K 323
11
17
AGI<$11K 380
20
AGI<$12K 374
19
AGI<$13K 371
24
AGI<$14K 364
13
AGI<$15K 383
21
AGI<$16K 339
24
AGI<$17K 359
22
AGI<$18K 322
26
AGI<$19K 347
6
AGI<$20K
93

0
0
0
1
0
4
2
3
3
4
8
4
5
7
4
3
4
7
8
2

0
1
1
4
2
5
6
6
8
5
9
10
7
8
7
11
14
8
13
4

1
20
18
28
42
32
57
52
64
60
69
62
53
56
58
54
60
47
52
14

0
2
2
2
1
0
3
6
2
1
4
5
3
2
3
6
6
2
2
1

0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
2
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
0

337
6%

107
2%

148
3%

974
17%

107
2%

48
1%

TTLS
PCT N
Notes:

5,796
100%

At AGI levels > $19,340, the EIC was unavailable (see "Max EI or AGI"
column of Table 3).
M = Millions.
K = Thousands.
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tions (like the IRC 179 expense election) to maximize refundable
EICs.
Table 4 summarizes selected descriptive statistics for all returns qualifying for the EIC for the 1989 tax year. It was developed from the 1989 SOI Public Use File [SOI, 1992]. The maxim u m available EIC for the 1989 tax year was $910 (see Table 3),
therefore, this amount was selected as the appropriate breakpoint for developing the number of returns with taxable interest
income (Int), dividends (Div's), Schedule E rent and royalty income (Sch E), and self-employment earnings from Schedules C
and F (Sch C/F). Also provided are the frequencies of taxpayers
with passive activity losses (PALs) and the alternative m i n i m u m
tax (AMT), both of which are typically associated with middleto high-income taxpayers. These amounts are summarized separately, by AGI class, and illustrate the underlying rationale for
the EIC wealth restriction-based limitations advanced by O'Neil
and Nelsestuen (1994) and the ever-increasing tax planning opportunities for EIC-maximization, in the absence of such wealth
restrictions, described by Cataldo (1994).
Of particular interest are the mean EICs available to highincome taxpayers in the zero or negative AGI class. Generally,
these are high-income taxpayers. These taxpayers are receiving
EICs in average amounts in excess of those available to taxpayers below (above) the $4,000 ($14,000) AGI classes.
Many of these high-income taxpayers, no doubt engaged in
non-EIC-related tax planning efforts, are, by chance or design,
earning additional after-tax, EIC-based returns of between 9%
and 14% (i.e., $910 divided by the $6,500 through $10,240 flat
r a n g e (1989), respectively) on potentially m a n i p u l a t e d EI
amounts.
Second, participation rates-based studies indicate t h a t
many (i.e., 14% to 25%) taxpayers, not otherwise required to file
an income tax return, but qualifying for the EIC, may not be
aware of the EIC-based benefits foregone through their failure
to file an income tax return [Scholz, 1994]. Furthermore, "...almost none of the recipients obtain the benefits incrementally
during the course of the year." The result is the " . . . almost total
ineffectiveness of the advance payment option..." [Yin and
Forman, 1993, pp. 951 & 953].
The failure to achieve very high AEIC participation rates,
through public awareness of its availability, defers any progress
(and administrative cost reductions) associated with the elimination of alternative welfare delivery systems. Though the InterPublished by eGrove, 1995
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nal Revenue Service has expanded efforts to publicize the EIC
program, they tend not to promote the AEIC option to minimize
noncompliance [Yin and Forman, pp. 954-956]. 9
Third, "(s)elf-employed individuals might declare work
when none had taken place in order to receive a higher value of
credit" [Steuerle, 1993]. Generally, this argument is consistent
with the overall trend of increasing EIC credit rate(s) (see Table
3), and their potential to exceed the combined federal and (net)
self-employment tax rate. RRA93 aggravates this problem.
For example, taxpayers, with two dependent children for
the 1996 tax year, might generate an EIC of 40%, while subject
to a marginal federal income tax rate of only 15% (or even 0%)
plus the self-employment tax rate of less than 15.3% (after adjustments), for a net "profit" of 10% (i.e., 40% minus approximately 30%) (see Table 3).
F u r t h e r m o r e , separate and apart from self-employment
earnings over-reporting, " . . . nearly one in three of those receiving the credit in 1990 was ineligible" [Kirchheimer, 1993].
Again, the incentive for false reporting evolves from the fact that
the EIC benefits or phase-in credit rate frequently exceeds the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate (see Table 3). Additional overpayments arise from income variability, multiple employers, and
those cases where both married taxpayers work and elect the
AEIC option [Holt, 1994, pp. 760-762].
Finally, the politically popular "workfare" or work incentive
feature of the EIC is questionable. Moore [1993, p. 106] reminds
us that
(f)or people already working, the EITC will increase
their overall income level in each and every range. Conventional analysis and a wide range of studies indicate
the "income effect" alone tends to discourage work,
since a family can attain any particular level of income
with less work than in the absence of the EITC payment.
(T)he "substitution" effect of the EITC varies with each
of the ranges. In the phase-in range, it encourages
9
Yin and Forman [1993, p. 954], noting the findings of a U.S. General
Accounting Office report [GAO/GGD-92-132, 1992], explain that the IRS, in an
effort to increase full compliance with the EIC, awarded the credit to 600,000
taxpayers for the 1991 tax year. These taxpayers failed to claim, but appeared to
qualify for the credit. The IRS subsequently found that 270,000 (45%) of the
awards were incorrect.
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work, because the reward for an additional hour of
work has increased. In the (flat) range, the substitution
effect does not come into play because the credit remains at the maximum level as income is increased.
Finally, in the phase-out range, the substitution effect
provides a disincentive (emphasis added) to work,
since the worker now finds that the EITC is reduced as
income increases. Thus, the worker's effective wage has
been reduced.
In the (flat) range, only the income effect applies, and
tends to discourage work.
The ever-increasing flat range (see Exhibits 2 and 3) results
only in the "income effect," and work efforts may be discouraged once achieved/surpassed. The phase-out range provides for
a work disincentive. The family is richer as a result of the EIC,
and additional work is less rewarding [Moore, 1993, p. 106].
These effects exacerbate the effective marginal tax rates of EIC
recipients to a minimum of 34.5% (i.e., the phase-out rate of
19.5% plus the marginal tax rate 15% for the 1993 tax year).
SUMMARY
The EIC phase-in rates have increased from 10%, for the
1975 through 1978 period, to a planned rate of as m u c h as 40%
for the 1996 tax year. Like the first EIC, established in the early
1920s, the post-RRA93 EIC is now available to taxpayers without dependents. Unlike the first EIC, expansion of the post-1974
EIC has taken the form of a "workfare"-based variation of guaranteed income or negative income tax. Increases in coverage
and phase-in credit percentages have taken place prior to the
resolution of problems with compliance and delivery, preventing
the EIC from replacing alternative welfare systems.
Without a wealth-based restriction, the EIC cannot progress
to replace traditional welfare systems possessing such features.
The higher, post-RRA93 EIC benefits and/or phase-in credit
rates may provide unintended beneficiaries with ever-increasing
economic incentives for the "positioning" of their earned income
within broadening flat ranges. Retaining the politically popular
"work incentive" feature of the EIC, which is incompatible with
existing welfare systems, is the very vehicle through which such
manipulation becomes possible.
Those responsible for the first EIC (1923-1931) were concerned with the infeasibility of successfully separating earned
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and unearned income components. They anticipated and completely avoided this latter issue, appearing to have left us with a
historical lesson unlearned.10 And this politically popular "work
incentive" feature may not even be supported by empirical evidence when substitution and income effects are considered.
If these issues remain unresolved, the next logical step in
the evolution of the EIC may remain the elimination of the
"work incentive" component. However, while elimination of the
need for any distinction between earned and unearned income
would resolve problems associated with EIC-maximizing tax
planning and provide for the elimination of concurrent transfer
payment systems, a wealth-based means-test would still be necessary.
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